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FEDERAL SENTENCING  UNDER "ADVISORY"
GUIDELINES:  OBSERVATIONS  BY DISTRICT
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Hon. Lynn  S.  Adelman
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Hon. Richard G. Kopf
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MODERATOR
Daniel  J. Capra
Philip  D. Reed Professor  of  Law
Fordham  Law School
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Good evening.  This is the Philip Reed program.
It is part of the Centennial  Celebration of Fordham  Law School.  The topic
tonight is entitled "Federal  Sentencing Under 'Advisory'  Guidelines."
* This panel discussion  was held on March  7, 2006,  at  Fordharn  University  School of Law.
The text of  the Panel Discussion transcript has been lightly edited.FORDHAMLAW REVIEW
The Federal Sentencing  Guidelines'  ("the Guidelines")  were designed to
control what has been referred to  as "unwarranted  disparity"  in sentencing.
Before  the Guidelines were  instituted, judges sentenced essentially  in  their
discretion,  and  Congress  believed-and,  in  some  cases, clearly  with good
reason-that this resulted in wildly different sentences for similarly situated
individuals.  So the Guidelines were  designed to control judicial discretion
by  setting  base  offense  levels  for  various  categories  of criminal  conduct.
Once  the  base  level  and  enhancements  were  put  together  with  any
reductions  that  were found, the  level  that was  reached was  matched on an
axis  with the defendant's  criminal  history.  This process  would  lead to  a
fairly  small range  of sentencing  guidelines.  The Guidelines  allowed some
discretion to  depart  from the  sentence reached  on that grid,  but departures
under  the  Guidelines  were  essentially  for very  unusual  and  very  limited
circumstances, or where the government moved for a downward departure.
The  Supreme  Court  invalidated this  system of mandatory  Guidelines  in
January of 2005  in United States v.  Booker.2  The Booker story began in a
case  called Apprendi v. New Jersey. 3  In Apprendi, the  Court  held that  it
was unconstitutional for a defendant  to be sentenced  beyond the sentencing
range  authorized  by  the  legislature  for a crime  based on  facts  found by a
judge by a preponderance  of the evidence,  rather than by  a jury  beyond a
reasonable  doubt.  The  Apprendi Court  reasoned  that  a  defendant  had  a
constitutional  expectation  to  be  sentenced  within  the  legislatively-
designated range  for the crime  charged and that his right  to a jury trial and
proof beyond  a reasonable doubt would be violated if the judge enhanced a
sentence beyond the statutory  maximum based on facts found at sentencing
by a preponderance of the evidence.
The  Court  in  Booker held  that  the  Apprendi rationale  applied  to  the
Sentencing  Guidelines as well, and that a sentence enhanced above the base
level would violate Apprendi because  it would result from facts found by a
district judge by a preponderance  of the evidence.  Because the Guidelines'
enhancements  were  based  on mandatory  judicial  fact-finding,  the  Booker
ruling  had  the  potential  to  either  scrap  the  whole  or  a  large  part  of the
system  or  render  these  facts  subject  to jury  determination,  which  would
basically mean trying  to  instruct juries on things  like  "more than  minimal
planning"  and "vulnerable  victims,"  an  arguably unworkable  system.  But
the remedial majority in Booker held that the constitutional solution was not
to invalidate the Guidelines as a whole but only to invalidate the Guidelines
insofar  as  they  mandated  enhancement  on  the  basis  of certain  facts-in
other  words,  insofar  as they  were  mandatory.  So  long  as the Guidelines
were advisory, they did not violate Apprendi, because the defendant has no
expectation  to be  sentenced  within a particular guideline  if the Guidelines
are only advisory.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000).
2.  543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3.  530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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The Court invalidated the  statute that mandated Guideline application,  18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).  In place of mandatory  Guidelines,  the Court held that
while  sentencing  courts  must  consult  the  Guidelines,  a  sentence  is  to  be
determined  as well by the general  factors of section  3553(a).  Those factors
include the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, to provide
just punishment,  to deter, to  avoid unwarranted  sentencing  disparities,  and
to consider  everything  and  impose  a  sentence  "sufficient,  but  not greater
than necessary, to comply with [all of these factors]. ''4  The sentences under
advisory Guidelines,  according  to Booker, are to  be reviewed by the courts
of  appeals  to  determine  not  whether  they  adhere  to  the  Guidelines,  but
whether they are reasonable.
This newfound discretion  in sentencing under Booker raises a number  of
important policy questions, probably the most important being how to avoid
unwarranted  sentencing  disparity  yet  allow  any  kind  of  discretion  in
sentencing.  Courts  are  taking  different  approaches.  There  are
approximately ten district judges who have written what I would refer to as
challenging  and influential opinions on how federal  courts should approach
sentencing under advisory  Guidelines.  We have five of them on this panel.
In alphabetical order, from left to right:
Judge  Lynn  Adelman,  Eastern  District  of  Wisconsin,  graduate  of
Columbia Law  School,  appointed to the  court in  1997  after serving twenty
years as a Wisconsin state senator.
Judge  Nancy  Gertner, District of Massachusetts,  graduate  of Yale  Law
School, appointed  to the  court in  1994.  Judge Gertner  teaches  a course on
sentencing  at  Yale  and  has  written  a  number  of  influential  law  review
articles on the topic.
Judge  Richard  Kopf, District  of Nebraska, a former Chief Judge  of that
District,  graduate  of the University  of Nebraska  Law  School, appointed  to
the court in 1992 after serving  five years as a magistrate judge.
Judge  Gerard  Lynch,  Southern  District  of New  York,  a  graduate  of
Columbia  Law School,  appointed to the court in 2000.  Judge Lynch was a
professor  at  Columbia  for  many  years  and  also  served  in  the  U.S.
Attorney's  Office  of  the  Southern  District,  including  as  Chief  of  the
Criminal Division.
Judge  Gregory  Presnell,  Middle  District  of  Florida,  graduate  of  the
University  of Florida  School  of Law,  appointed to  the  court in  2000  after
more than thirty years in private practice.
Our  format  tonight is  to take  short opening  statements  from the judges
and then to discuss some particular issues of controversy  in sentencing  after
Booker.  I plan to open it up to questions and comments from the  audience
at the end.
Judge Adelman.
4.  18  U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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JUDGE ADELMAN:  Thank you very much.  I am delighted to be here.
I  thank  Fordham  Law  School  and  Professor  Capra.  It  is  a  particular
pleasure  for me to be  in New York City, which  is where  I got my first job
as a  lawyer with the  Legal  Aid Society  down  at  100  Centre  Street.  I am
happy to be back here.
In  these  opening  statements  we  were  asked  to  say  a  few  words  about
Booker.  For me, that is  not hard to do.  The system  created by Booker is  a
vast improvement over the mandatory Guidelines.
I got on the bench in 1997, and the Guidelines were in full swing by then.
I had practiced criminal law in the pre-Guidelines  system, and  I had a lot of
trouble  with  the  mandatory  Guidelines.  I  think  the  new  system  is  much,
much  fairer.  In  many  cases,  I  think  the  sentences  required  by  the
mandatory  Guidelines  were  too  harsh.  The  judge  was  prohibited  from
considering  many  very  important  factors,  like  what  kind  of person  the
defendant was  or the motive for the crime.  To some extent, I think those  of
us who  had  been  involved  in sentencing  under  the Guidelines  had gotten
used to  this.  But when  you think  about  it  from  a little  bit of a  distance,
some  of  the  things  that  you  could  not  consider  under  the  mandatory
Guidelines seem really shocking.
The  sentencing  hearing  under the  mandatory  Guidelines  made  no sense
to the public or to the defendant.  You did not talk about "moral culpability"
or any of the traditional  things that  are supposed  to  be part of sentencing,
such  as  the  defendant's  character,  the  reason  that  he  offended,  or  the
likelihood  that  he  would  re-offend.  Instead,  you talked  about  how many
points on the grid a defendant  should be assessed for some particular  item.
In  this  respect  and  others,  the  mandatory  Guidelines  system  was  deeply
flawed.
Under  Booker,  however,  the  focus  at  sentencing  is  no  longer  the
Guidelines  but  section  3553(a),  and,  unlike  the  Guidelines,  this  statute
allows  judges  to  consider  everything  that  is  important  in  sentencing  a
defendant.  Because  the  Guidelines  are  no  longer  mandatory,  the
defendant's allocution and the lawyers'  statements  are meaningful.  None of
that  was  true  under  the  mandatory  Guidelines.  Sentencing  under  the
mandatory  Guidelines  was  a  rote  process-the  defendant  would  make  a
statement  and the  lawyers  would make  statements,  but  they really  did not
have anything to do with anything because the grid was God.
In my opinion, the system we have now, with Booker, is about as good as
we are going to get in the foreseeable  future.  But we  have a lot of work to
do to preserve  it,  so anybody  who  is  concerned  about  sentencing  ought to
work very  hard to preserve  it.  To me,  that means  making the case  for  the
present  system.  It means talking about how  much better the system is and
why.  In  defending  the  new  system,  judges  have  too  often  made  the
argument  that,  "Well,  it  is  a good  system because  it  is not  that  different;
everybody  is still sentencing close to the Guidelines."  I do not think that is
a winning argument.  I  do not think that you are going to  win a debate by
saying "nothing has changed."
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A lot has changed-it should have changed-and  we should say why the
change  is good.  I think that is  an  argument we  have  to make to Congress,
and we have to make it very strongly.
We  also  have  to  convince  the  courts  of  appeals  that  in  reviewing
sentencing decisions for reasonableness, they are  focusing too much on the
Guidelines  and  not  enough  on  the  other  § 3553(a)  factors  or  on  the
parsimony  provision.  In  addition,  one  avenue that Booker opens  up  is to
continue  to  talk  about  the  flaws  in  the  Guidelines.  Even  though  the
Guidelines  are  not  mandatory,  they  are  still  there,  and  a  lot  of people
overvalue  them.  I think we  have to talk about  what  particular Guidelines
are  based  on,  and  often  that  is  very  little.  Finally,  I think  district judges
have to work together to be  comfortable with their new empowerment  and
to improve sentencing practices.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Judge Gertner.
JUDGE  GERTNER:  I want to start at the beginning here.  I want to talk
a  little  bit  about  what  the  Guidelines  system  was  supposed  to  be  at  the
outset, then how it went wrong.
In the Maine Law Review article that I wrote,5 I described how everyone
behaved  badly.  So  first:  How  the Guidelines  system  went wrong,  what
Booker contributes  to  salvaging  the  system,  and  how we  are  about  to  go
wrong again.  I am much more of a pessimist than Judge Adelman.
What was the system at the outset?  Because  I teach this, I  actually read
the  statute,  the legislative  history,  and  every  morsel  of the  material.  The
elimination  of  disparity  was  not  the  only  purpose  of  the  Sentencing
Guidelines.  Plainly,  the  Sentencing  Reform  Act  was  intended  to  look  at
sentencing  from  top to  bottom,  listing all the  purposes  of sentencing  that
were then extant-rehabilitation,  retribution, and eliminating  disparity.  The
Sentencing  Commission was supposed to be an expert body that would also
be  a scientific  body;  it would  look at recidivism  studies  and bring  to bear
the best scientific wisdom that it could bring.
The result was  not necessarily a system  in  which judges were  to follow
Guidelines  by rote,  but  a system where-if you understand  that  the initial
Guidelines  were drafted in only a year; essentially it was a rough cut-there
would be departures  if there was a factor of a kind or to  a degree that had
not been adequately considered  by the  Commission.  And, in a sense, there
was a feedback loop in which the judges, if they thought the  Guidelines did
not fit the case at bar, would  say so.  The Commission would take that into
account, and there would be a continuing perfection of the Guidelines.
It  did  not  happen  that  way.  The  Guidelines  essentially  supplanted
everything.  It was  almost  as if we could  no  longer  speak about  anything
else, including the statute or the judicial role.  We were only speaking about
5.  Nancy  Gertner, Sentencing Reform:  When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57  Me. L. Rev.
569 (2005).
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the Guidelines  and  about compliance  with the  Guidelines,  which  were  not
at all the terms in which the statute had begun.
The Commission  made  certain  choices  that in fact  made  the  Guidelines
more  rigid.  It  was  almost  as  if, when  there  was  an  issue  of judicial
discretion,  the  Commission  opted  for  less.  It  created  an  enormously
complex  grid,  which  gave  the  illusion  of  certainty  and  the  reality  of
something  less.  The  Guidelines  focused  on  quantitative  measures  rather
than the usual  measures of sentencing,  which is to  say  it mattered  whether
the bank robber  robbed  $15,000  rather  than  doing exactly  the  same thing
but only  robbing $5,000.  They  focused on criminal history and, to  a  large
degree,  deemphasized-and  in  some  cases discouraged-consideration  of
personal characteristics.
The  Guidelines  themselves  were  not  subject  to  the  Administrative
Procedure  Act.  That is to say, you could never go into court and say, "You
know,  this  Guideline  does  not  match the  data  on  which  the  Commission
was  basing it."  You could only  say,  "The  Guideline  does  not necessarily
apply in my case.  I have a case outside the heartland."
Congress  behaved  badly.  Congress  created  mandatory  minimums,  and
rather  than  give  the  Commission  discretion,  Congress  directed  the
Commission  to change  the Guidelines.  Congress basically overstepped the
implicit  boundaries  in  the  Sentencing  Reform  Act.6  The  appeals  courts,
which  could have  interpreted  departure  authority  broadly, did  not;  rather,
they narrowed departure  authority.  My personal  favorite  is when the First
Circuit  reversed  me  in  a  case  involving  extraordinary  family
circumstances. 7  Now, the statute  says that the Commission was to consider
the  extent  to  which  family  circumstances  were  relevant.  The  courts
interpreted that as "extraordinary  family circumstances."  The First Circuit
decided  that  the  only  person  who  can  get  a departure  down  in  a case  of
family  circumstances  is  a  person  who  was  irreplaceable.  I  have  two
teenaged sons;  I am not irreplaceable-ask them.  A single mother was  not
irreplaceable  because  it was so common to be  sentencing women offenders
who were single mothers.
The district court judges, I  might add, for the most part did not interpret
the  Guidelines  but applied  them as  if they were  the Tax Code.  As Judge
Adelman said,  sentencing, instead of being an occasion  in which the moral
authority of the state is brought to bear on an individual, was an occasion  on
which you said, "You are an offense  level twelve, criminal history two, the
range is this,"  and virtually nothing else.  Rather than encouraging judicial
creativity,  the  Guidelines  did  just the  opposite.  There  was  no  feedback
loop.  Over time, judicial departures  were  seen as lack of compliance  with
the Guidelines.
6.  Sentencing Reform Act,  18 U.S.C. 3551-3586 (2000).
7.  United  States v. Thompson, 74 F. Supp. 2d  69 (D. Mass.  1999),  vacated and rev'd,
234  F.3d 74  (1st Cir. 2000).
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Booker was  an  interesting  moment  in  the  sentencing  story  and  should
have  been  a  moment  of creativity  for all  the  players.  Booker essentially
said  that  when  the  Guidelines  had  determinative  consequences-in  other
words, if I  find $50,000,  I am in this range-there  was no discretion; there
was no moment in which I could look at the individual and say, "That might
be the  range,  but you are  someone  who does  not need to be  in that  range
because  of your  past,"  whatever  the characteristics  were.  Since it became
rote,  with  specific  facts  having  determinative  consequences,  what  I  was
doing looked over time exactly  like what the jury was doing.  I think that is
really the core of  Booker.
Justice  Scalia had an  interesting  point, which  is that,  "I  was doing what
the jury  was  doing,  with  few  procedural  safeguards.  There  are  not  the
safeguards of a jury trial."
So Booker was a moment of creativity.  I  love the description  that Doug
Berman  gave to the meaning  of that moment.  Quoting  Ryan  S. King  and
Marc Mauer, he said that we  have the possibility of "'rational jurisprudence
and  thoughtful  statutory  interpretation,"'  and  that  there  is  "'a  new
methodology of judicial deliberation.' 8
There  are  now,  as  Professor  Capra  said,  countless  decisions  on
sentencing, weighing and measuring and bringing into the public  issues that
had  heretofore  not  been  discussed  publicly.  While  I do  not  agree  with
everything that everyone says,  it is a discussion that seems  critical, and the
courts of appeals are joining in that discussion.
The problem is that we are being measured in Congress and by the public
not by our creativity or our thoughtful decisions, but by whether or not this
system is promoting or undermining disparity.  In other words, we are being
measured  by compliance.  We  are  being  measured  in precisely  the  terms
that  one  would have thought Booker jettisoned.  As one judge  in  Oregon,
Michael  Marcus,  described it to me, it is as if the only thing we are talking
about  is whether  I  am  doing the  same  thing  as  Judge  Adelman  is doing,
even if we  are both wrong.9  And, indeed, when you think about it, that is
the only measure.
Having said that,  I understand the concern with disparity.  There  is really
a continuum  here.  On the  one hand there were  the mandatory  Guidelines,
which Booker made unconstitutional  insofar as  a judge applied  them.  On
the other hand, there was what I like to describe as  "free  at last," which was
sort  of a  return  to  the  pre-Guidelines  moment.  I  believe  that  we  are
somewhere  in between.  Another  way  to  look at the  continuum  is  there is
"free  at last,"  then there  are  voluntary  guidelines,  presumptive  guidelines,
8.  Douglas A. Berman,  Tweaking Booker:  Advisory Guidelines in the Federal  System,
43 Hous.  L.  Rev.  341,  351  (2006) (quoting Ryan  S.  King  & Marc Mauer, The  Sentencing
Project,  Sentencing  with  Discretion:  Crack  Cocaine  Sentencing  After Booker 20  (2006),
available  at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/crackcocaine-afterbooker.pd).
9.  For  an  overview  of Judge  Michael  Marcus's  views  on  sentencing,  see  Michael
Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices Public Safety:  What's Wrong and How We
Can Fix It,  16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 76 (2003).
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and mandatory guidelines.  I think we are somewhere in the middle, which I
describe  this way:  We ought to be sentencing based on standards.  It is past
the  time  when  we  can  say,  "Gee,  I  do not  think  this  crime  ought  to  be
treated  as  severely  as  Congress  and  the  Commission  have  apparently
determined."  We have to be talking about standards.
But  the standards  are  not only  the  Guidelines.  The  Guidelines  are  one
source of standards;  statutes  provide another source.  I argue for a common
law of sentencing, in which judges  describe  a  set of standards,  explain the
ways  in  which  the  Guidelines  are  imperfect,  and  come  up  with  reasons.
The Commission  should be promulgating  standards based  on studies about
recidivism  and  efficacy,  not just  about  compliance-the  kinds  of studies
that I had hoped it would do in the beginning.
I had hoped that judges would interpret the Guidelines.  There is a way in
which,  as  I  said, it has become  so  rote.  I  was  in the middle of writing  an
article when Booker came down, that of course  I had to throw out, that said
that what judges were  doing was  treating  the  Guidelines  as  if they were  a
civil code.  In a civil code  system, you look at the book for an answer;  you
believe  that the statutes  are  comprehensive,  that someone  else has  thought
through everything, and that all you have  to do is figure out the meaning  of
the words.
So  we  would  have  case  law  on  what  "extensive  organization"  meant,
which was  mostly  relying  on  Webster's Dictionary and not  on legislative
history.  There  was  no  legislative  history,  for  the  most  part,  for  the
Guidelines.  What  was  the  purpose  behind  "extensive  organization"  and
why are we making that a more culpable category?  What does "vulnerable
victim" mean, and what kinds of people did the Commission have in mind?
Instead, judges  are literally  looking  at  it flat,  looking  only  at the word,
and asking, "What does it mean?"  I want judges to interpret the Guidelines.
I  want  the Guidelines  departure  authority  to be  interpreted  in light  of the
purposes  of sentencing.  In  other  words,  I  would  like  the  First  Circuit  to
abandon  the  "irreplaceable"  category  and  to  say,  "Why  do  we  lighten
sentences when someone has a family  situation that is compelling?  Are we
concerned about the family?  Are we concerned about the individual?  What
did we  have  in mind?"  I believe  we  would have  a  more  consistent and  a
more fair approach if we did that.
I  want  there  to  be  common  law  standards,  as  I  said.  Common  law
standards  can  evolve  in  the  way judicial  standards  have  evolved  in  every
other area of the  law.  There  is a general rule, and  you ask the question  of
whether or not the general rule applies to the case  in front of you:  Does this
case fit the kind of case that the Guidelines  drafters had in mind?  Does this
case fit the  heartland?  There may have been reasons why the Commission,
for  example,  excluded  age  as  a  consideration  in  sentencing,  and  I  can
understand that.  Age sometimes  points  in the  direction  of recidivism, and
sometimes it excuses  behavior.  But I may have a case in which  the vector
of age points in one direction.  This is judicial thinking; this is thinking that
is informed by rules and standards.
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In  addition,  what  Booker  has  done,  which  is  magnificent,  is  to  pay
attention  to  the  procedures  of sentencing.  The  procedures  of sentencing
derive  from  a period of time when  a judge could  think about  and  listen to
anything.  When sentencing  was more  like  a  clinical judgment, the judge
could consider anything.  You would no more tell a doctor that he could not
consider a  fact than you could tell a judge  in those days that  he could  not
consider a fact.  Anything came into the sentencing proceeding,  subject to a
fair preponderance  review.  Yet, now the  facts that I  find in that sentencing
proceeding  are going  to have  substantial  consequences.  So Booker has at
least alerted us to concerns about the burden of proof and about procedure.
Predicting  doom  and  disaster,  however,  the  Commission  has  issued
statistics  which purport  to  show  compliance  and what  the various  district
courts and circuits are doing.'0  It is as if the only question is how the most
accountable  players  are  doing, but  not all the other  sources of disparity  in
the system.  The most accountable  players  have to be on the record, subject
to  appeal.  What  the  prosecutor  does  is not  on  the  record, not  subject  to
appeal,  and  not  subject  to  accessible  guidelines.  Yet,  the  focus  is  on
judicial disparity.
One interesting  statistic:  Sentencing  length has  not changed, even while
departures  have gone up in some parts of the country.  What does it mean?
It  means  that  sentencing  is  a  system  in  which judges  and  prosecutors
participate.  Both players are working towards consistent ends; it is not just
the judges.  But  the sentencing  lengths have remained the  same.  To focus
on judicial  departures,  then,  is  to  suggest  that  this  is  really  more  about
symbolism, more about candidly criticizing the entity that everyone loves to
criticize, rather than talking about real efficacy or sentencing lengths.
The  district courts  have had a hard time getting  out of-I think Berman
calls it-"the culture of compliance."  In one  sense, that is understandable.
The  Guidelines anchored-that  is really Judge Lynch's word-the way we
talked about and thought about guidelines.  Most of the current bench never
existed in a pre-Guidelines  world, so they define fairness by the Guidelines.
You do not have to do much to keep this group of people  in line.  They will
frame the  sentencing  in  terms of the  Guidelines.  In fact, if you step  back
and say that most of the bench now has been appointed by Republicans,  and
if there  are  departures  under Booker we  ought  to  step  back  and  say  that
maybe they signify  problems with the Guidelines  rather than judges  going
wild.  You can see the TV news report:  "Judges going wild."
Everything, in fact, militates in favor of the continuing  significance of the
Guidelines.  If there  is flexibility, it is flexibility in areas where  there ought
to have been flexibility.  I have done a study of my own court.  Most of the
departures  are,  for example,  for the guy who has  been  in INS  custody  for
10.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  Sentencing  Commission,  Booker  and  Fanfan  Materials,
http://www.ussc.gov/bf.htm  (last visited Aug.  17,  2006);  see also United States  Sentencing
Commission,  Federal  Sentencing  Statistics  by  State,  District,  and  Circuit,
http://www.ussc.gov/LINKTOJP.HTM  (last visited Aug.  17, 2006).
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eight months  and is going to be deported.  Let us count that eight months as
part of the sentence; he was essentially in custody.
Many judges all across  the country  are looking  at disparity between co-
defendants.  We  all  have  had  the  experience  of  winding  up  with  three
people  who have done  essentially  the same thing, but when  you looked at
the  column  of  figures  you  said,  "Oh  my  God, why  is  he  getting twenty
years and she is getting X?"  So judges have been tweaking the Guidelines,
for  the  most  part  either  following  them  and  being  totally  compliant  or
seeking flexibility  in areas in which flexibility is deserved.
One  last  comment:  A  judge  on  my  court,  who  was  appointed  by  a
Republican  and who was a prosecutor  all his life, had a case called  United
States v.  Glavin.II  The  individual was born to  a fourteen-year-old mother.
When  he  was  eleven,  she  shot  him  up  with  heroin  to  keep  him  quiet.
Between eleven and twenty, he wound up with a series of small drug crimes
that for the most part never got him in state prison.  Then he  walked into a
bank  and,  with  his  finger  in  his  pocket,  stole  $300.  The  Guidelines
mandated ten years.  Judge Wolf decided to go down to seven or eight.
The  departures  have  not  been  substantial,  which  is  why  sentencing
lengths have stayed the same.  But Booker is a moment of creativity.  If we
can  leave sentencing as this, rather than what is now being proposed in the
legislature  or what we  believe will be proposed  in the  legislature,  which is
doing something to "get those darn judges in line."
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Judge Kopf?
JUDGE  KOPF:  If you  have  had  the  pleasure  of reading  these  four
judges'  opinions, as I have, you know that I am here as the goat.  My job is
to attract the predators, and then you get to watch them kill me.
[Laughter]
I want to thank Professor Capra for inviting me.  It is truly an honor.  It is
especially flattering to be associated with Judges Adelman, Gertner, Lynch,
and  Presnell.  They  are  superb judges-I  mean  this  sincerely-and  I  am
sure that I will learn a lot from them this evening.
Second, and by way of context, I am from the hinterlands.  Despite that, I
sentenced  240 people in 2005.  The average federal district judge sentences
roughly one hundred.
The majority of the sentences that  I imposed  in the District of Nebraska
were  for drug  offenses.  As a  result of these  240 people  that I  had to face
and pronounce  sentences  on, my thoughts about Booker are  forged  from a
heavy diet of criminal  cases,  generating, as Judge Gertner suggested,  some
God-awfully  long  prison  sentences.  Put another  way,  it  is  quite possible
that  my  views  about  Booker  are  wrong.  If that  is  so,  I  have  lots  of
experience  committing reversible error.
11.  Transcript of Sentencing  Hearing  at  35-46, United  States  v. Glavin,  No. 04-10093
(D. Mass. Feb. 18,  2005) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
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I can express  my thoughts regarding Booker in five fairly short points.
Point one:  In my  opinion,  the overarching  significance  of the remedial
opinion in Booker is that it forces  federal judges to consciously decide how
properly to exercise  discretion  in  a democratic  society.  Starkly put, if the
choice is between a skinny or a muscular judicial role, I pick the weak one.
Point two-and here  I think Judge  Gertner  and  I will have  a significant
disagreement about what the facts are:  As I look at the facts, I do not think
one  can  objectively  examine  the  history  of the  Guidelines  and  honestly
conclude that Congress thinks the  Guidelines conflict with  the statutes that
Congress  wrote.  It  is  far  more  consistent  with  an  honest  reading  of the
record,  in  my  opinion,  to  conclude  that  the  Guidelines  truly  express
Congress's  view  about  how  best  to  achieve  the  statutory  goals  of
sentencing.  By this, I do not mean to suggest that Congress is right or that I
agree  with  Congress.  I mean  only that the  Guidelines,  like administrative
regulations in other contexts,  are most often an accurate  expression of what
Congress wants.
Point  three:  Deference  to  the  will  of  Congress  as  expressed  in  the
Guidelines  is  not  antithetical  to  the  exercise  of judicial  discretion  as
mandated  by  Booker.  Booker  did  mandate  the  exercise  of  judicial
discretion.  However,  deference  means  that  absent a plainly  superior  and
principled  reason  for  doing  something  different,  a judge  should  freely
choose to  exercise  his or her judicial  discretion in  a way  that  is consistent
with the Guidelines.  This is so even though it may be reasonable  in a world
without the Guidelines to do something  different.  As between  two rational
choices, one can properly exercise discretion  under Booker by adopting  the
choice that Congress has endorsed via the  Guidelines.  That is why several
circuit  courts  have  now  held  that,  post-Booker,  a  sentence  within  the
Guidelines is presumptively reasonable.
Point four:  Unless there  is an  obviously  superior reason for  selecting a
non-Guidelines  sentence  in a particular case-and I acknowledge  that there
are such cases-the Guidelines'  sentence  is the only proper choice.
Here,  I noticed  Judge  Gertner's  reference  to  Judge  Wolf's  decision  to
impose  a  seven-year  sentence  rather  than  a  ten-year  sentence.  You  can
articulate  a rationale  for the seven-year sentence,  but you are articulating  a
rationale for the seven-year sentence that is different than the rationale that,
in my  opinion, Congress  approved.  Unless  you are  able  to  put together  a
theoretically  coherent  explanation  that  is  going  to  apply  not  only  in  the
seven-year  case in Boston, but also in Wisconsin, Nebraska, New York, and
California, then I wonder what you are doing.
The final point is this:  I do not have a lot of confidence in district judges.
I have  a  lot  of confidence  in their ethics  and  their  hard  work.  I have no
confidence  in their  ability to put together  a coherent, analytical  sentencing
method.  We  simply lack  the institutional  and personal  competence  to  do
that.  Because  of that,  and  if for  no  other  reason,  we  ought  to  give  the
Guidelines heavy or substantial weight when we sentence.
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With  that,  once  again,  and  hoping  that  I  play  the  goat  to  everyone's
satisfaction,  it is a pleasure being here.
PROFESSOR  CAPRA:  Judge Presnell
JUDGE  PRESNELL:  Thank you.  It is great to be here.  I  always enjoy
coming  to New York, although  I feel  a bit like  a fish  swimming upstream,
as most people  at this time of year, given their choice, would be going from
New York to Florida rather than vice versa.  Also,  I was hopeful  that I was
going to go last so that everything meaningful would have been said.
First, let  me  make  a  disclaimer:  I am not  a Guidelines expert.  If you
have  seen  the Guidelines,  they  are like  a  fairly  good-sized  phone book.  I
was a civil trial lawyer for thirty-two years,  so when I came on the federal
bench  I had no earthly  idea what the  Guidelines were  like.  But I dutifully
tried to learn and  apply the Guidelines,  thinking  that there  was a coherent
and reasonable  rationale for why I was doing so.
After sentencing hundreds of people over the course of the last five years,
before Booker, it occurred  to me that I was not needed in the process.  I felt
like I was a meaningless  figurehead  in the administration of justice when it
came to criminal sentencing.  As my colleagues  have said, unless there was
a  scoring  dispute,  pre-Booker I  had  virtually  no  discretion  to  consider
anything except to impose a Guidelines  sentence.
Mothers would  come  in, crying,  talking about  why their  child had  gone
wrong, that it was their fault, and to please  have mercy.  I would listen to
that, and I would have to tell her, "Frankly, Ma'am, mercy is not a concept I
am allowed to consider."  I mean that is a bold statement, but it is true.  If I
departed  because  I  felt,  as  a  matter  of subjective  judgment,  that  mercy
required it,  the Eleventh  Circuit would  have  reversed  me  in a heartbeat-
and pre-Booker, it was pretty good at that.
The issue now, of course,  is this:  With the discretion that  we have, how
much discretion are we going to be given?  The only thing we are  working
with  is  the  notion of reasonableness;  that  is,  is  the  sentence  we  impose
reasonable?  We  consult  the Guidelines,  we  look at the other factors,  and
we impose  a sentence.  Now, post-Booker, I write more  sentencing opinions
than I used to because I think it is  important that I explain  my rationale  for
why I think a sentence in a particular case is appropriate.
Thus  far,  the Eleventh  Circuit  has  confirmed  several  below-Guidelines
sentences,  including one of mine;  and another one of mine, the  Williams 12
opinion, is scheduled for oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit in May.
What  I want  to talk about briefly  is something else that I have discussed
in  my  opinions.  It  relates  to  the  post-Booker attitude  of the  Executive
Branch  of  our  government.  Post-Booker  we  are  supposed  to  have
discretion.  The Supreme  Court says that the Guidelines are not mandatory,
but the Department of Justice, through written  memoranda and the  conduct
12.  United  States v. Williams,  372 F. Supp. 2d  1335 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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and  policies  that  have  been  exhibited  by  the  Assistant  United  States
Attorneys, are still taking the position that the Guidelines are mandatory.
It may be different in other parts of the country,  but in the Middle District
of Florida, if I  impose a sentence  below the Guidelines,  after we have done
the scoring and everything, and  I  say,  "I  have  considered the  Guidelines,  I
give deference to the Guidelines,  but considering these other factors  I think
a  lower  sentence  is appropriate,"  the government  routinely  stands  up and
says, "Your Honor, for the record I object."
Being a bit feisty, I will say, "Well,  what is the basis for your objection?"
The response will be, "Well, it is not a Guidelines sentence."
I will  say,  "Well,  it  does  not  have  to  be  a Guidelines  sentence.  What
factual basis do you have on the record to say that the § 3553(a) factors  that
I considered result in an unreasonable  sentence?"
The Government  does not have any factual basis except  that  it is a non-
Guidelines  sentence.  Its  rationale  is that  it  is  concerned  about  sentencing
disparity and the need for sentencing uniformity.
I have  written in my opinions,  however, that  I think that these concerns
are plainly disingenuous  because  the Government  is only concerned  about
below-Guidelines  sentences.  If I  go  above  the  Guidelines'  sentence,  the
Government is happy;  it does not care about that.  And I have issued above-
Guidelines sentences as well as below-Guidelines  sentences.
The  other thing that  I  find interesting-and  I am  the only  district judge
who  either  finds  it  interesting  or dares  to  talk  about  it-is the  reporting
requirements  that  the  Department  of Justice  has  come  up  with.  District
judges who get out of line are reported on a Booker form.  After Booker, the
Justice Department  came out with a policy that told all of the United States
Attorneys that, "If you have any judges in your district who give a sentence
below the Guidelines,  you have to fill out this form."  On the form they talk
about what  the U.S. Attorney  thinks was my reason  for the  sentence.  The
form  also  says  that  they  are  going  to use  this  information  in  the  policy
debate  regarding sentencing  legislation.  It  is clear that  they are  collecting
these  statistics  and  giving  what  they  think  I  am  doing  as  a  basis  for  the
public debate.
So  I  asked for a copy  of my Booker forms.  That request  created great
consternation  and,  I  am  sure,  several  e-mails  between  Washington  and
Orlando.  The  result  was that they  respectfully  declined to  give me  those
forms.  Not  to be  deterred,  I filed  a Freedom of Information  Act  (FOIA)
request.
[Applause]
The  FOIA  statute  gives  them  six  weeks  to  respond.  I mean  if we  are
going to  have  a public  debate,  let us  make  it transparent.  And if anybody
knows  whether  the  rationale I gave  was my rationale,  you  would  think it
would be me.
Well,  it took the  government  four months to  reply  to my FOIA request.
You  could  see  that  the  reason  for  the  delay  was  the  terribly  insightful
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analysis  they gave  in their two-word  response:  "Request  denied."  I have
appealed  that  denial.  It  is  now  somewhere  in  the  dark  hole  of  some
administrative appeal division in the Department of Justice.
There  is some  levity in this, but I think there are  some real  implications
here on the independence of the judiciary.  If you think about it, what really
is going on here  is a political  power struggle.  The Executive  Branch  does
not want the judges  to have  a meaningful  role in  sentencing because,  pre-
Booker, the  government  investigated  the  crime,  they  charged  the  crime,
they prosecuted the  crime, and they sentenced.  Judges had no meaningful
role.  That power has now been taken away from the Executive Branch, and
it is resisting.
Alexis  de Tocqueville said there were two things critical  for the survival
of  this  new  form  of  government:  a  free  and  vibrant  press  and  an
independent judiciary.  I think  the  independence  of the judiciary  is under
attack,  and  I  think  Booker and  post-Booker development  of the  law  has
profound implications with respect to the independence of our judiciary.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Judge Lynch.
JUDGE  LYNCH:  I  am  so  glad  that  Judge  Kopf  is  here  because
otherwise  I  would probably be  the right wing of this panel  and that would
creep me out.
[Laughter]
I want to focus my comments on four key words.
First word:  guidelines.  I am for guidelines.  I have been for guidelines
since I was a law student and read Marvin Frankel's book.13
It  is  important  to  go  back  and  think  about  what  sentencing  was  like
before  the  Guidelines  in the  federal  system.  In  the  Southern  District  of
New York, we  had an institution  called Part  One.  Part One  was the place
you went to be arraigned when you were indicted.  There  was a particular
judge  assigned each  week to be  in Part One.  The rules  for the division  of
business  were  that  if you pled not  guilty, your case  would be  assigned  at
random  to some  other judge.  If you pled guilty, the  Part One judge  would
hear your plea and then sentence you later.  When some judges were  in Part
One, the line to plead  guilty  was out the door,  down Duane  Street, over to
Broadway,  and  back  up  halfway  to  Fordham.  When  other judges  were
there, no one pled guilty.  And if that same judge's name happened to come
at  random  out of the wheel,  the judge  would  give  a  little  smile,  and the
defense lawyer's heart would sink.  That is not the way things should be.
Frankly,  I do  not  know  that  the  reason  for  those  differences  between
judges was that the judges had radically different  views about which crimes
were  worse.  I  think the problem really was that judges  had very different
ideas about what constituted  a severe  or lenient sentence.  For one judge a
lenient sentence  for a particular crime  might be five  years and a tough one
13.  Marvin Frankel, Criminal  Sentences:  Law Without Order (1973).
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ten,  while  for the judge  down  the  hall  leniency  might  be  probation  and
severity five years.  We needed guideposts.  So I am for guidelines.
On  the  other  hand,  "guidelines"  does  not  mean  rigid  mandates.  This
brings me to the second  key word:  disparity.  But what does "disparity"  in
sentencing mean?  It is a very slippery word.
I think it is a good  thing for people  to be  consistent.  It  is wrong  for  a
defendant  to  go to jail  for ten years  because  he happens  to  have his  case
assigned  to  me,  when  he  would  go to jail  for five  years  if the same  case
were assigned to the judge next door.  That is not the way things should be.
We all understand that, and we all want some system that will help to make
sentencing more consistent.
But what does "disparity"  mean?  It means treating  like cases unlike, but
it also means treating unlike  cases alike.  That is a piece of the problem that
we  have  not  heard  discussed  much.  After  all,  we  could  have  absolutely
uniform  sentencing in this country.  It would only take  one  law.  The law
would  say  "anyone  who  is  convicted  of a crime  shall  go  to jail  for  five
years.  It does not matter if it is murder or rape,  it does not matter if it is a
misdemeanor,  it  does  not  matter  if it  is  spitting  on  the  sidewalk--every
criminal goes to jail for five years."  We would have total even-handedness;
everyone would get the same sentence.  It would not matter what judge you
went before.  But obviously,  that would not be justice because  those cases
are  different.  Murderers  should go to jail  for longer than people who  spit
on the sidewalk.
As we think about disparity, we have to be aware of the problem that we
are trying to treat like cases alike, while also trying to make meaningful  and
relevant distinctions between cases.  This is where it gets complicated.
The  Guidelines  book,  as  you  were  told, becomes  the  size  of a  phone
book.  That  is  because  if you  try  to  foresee  every  wrinkle  that  could
possibly  affect how  severely  criminals should  be treated, you are going to
get not one phone book but two, not two but three.
Even  if we  have  that feedback  loop  that Judge  Gertner  referred  to, that
still will not solve the problem because the idea of departures as feedback to
the  Sentencing  Commission  aims  at  the  unattainable  ideal  of  the
Guidelines'  perfection.  If a sentencing judge identified a factor not listed in
the Guidelines that indicated a difference between one  case and another, the
thing  to  do was  to write that factor  into the  Guidelines.  Then,  if another
judge comes up with another wrinkle, we will write that into the Guidelines,
too.  We will try to capture all of human diversity, all the varieties of human
evil,  all  the  varieties  of human  sorrow,  into  a  code  that  will  somehow
mathematically  cover  everything.  I think it cannot  be done.  I  think there
will always be differences that cannot be captured by such a calculus.  Then
we  have  to worry  whether we  are  creating  disparity by  treating the unlike
alike, by failing to consider all the things that ought to be considered.
I  want to talk about  a third word today:  compliance.  We are  going  to
hear  a  lot,  I  suspect,  in the  upcoming  debate  about  compliance  with  the
Guidelines.
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But  "compliance"  is  almost  as  slippery  a  word  as  "disparity."  The
Sentencing  Commission  has  compiled  a  lot of statistics  about  sentencing
after  Booker, and  there  is  a  great  article  in  the  Houston Law  Review  by
Frank  Bowman  that  analyzes  all  of  these  statistics. 14   One  question
Bowman addresses is what he calls the extent of judges'  "compliance"  with
the  Guidelines.  But  the  one  objection  I had  to Bowman-and  I  tried  to
persuade  him to  use  a different word-is  that the  word "compliance"  is a
very  bad  word  because  it  suggests  disobedience.  The  idea  is  that  if a
sentence  is within the Guidelines, it  is a compliant sentence; if the sentence
is given  outside the  Guidelines,  for whatever  reason,  it  is a  noncompliant
sentence.  That is a mistake for a number of reasons.
One  mistake  is  something  Nancy  referred  to  earlier:  The  Guidelines
themselves,  and the  Sentencing  Reform Act  itself, contemplate  departures.
To depart is not to be noncompliant;  to depart  is to  say that  there is  a fact
about this case that is important to sentencing  and that the Guidelines do not
adequately  take  into  account.  An  outside-the-Guidelines  sentence  is
sometimes  entirely  compliant  with the Guidelines,  because  the Guidelines
themselves  authorize  various  departures.  Also,  after  Booker,  even  a
sentence  that  is  outside the  Guidelines  system  is  fully compliant  with the
law, because  § 3553(a) makes the Guidelines only one factor to consider in
imposing  a  sentence.  So  it  is  not  noncompliant  to  be  outside  the
Guidelines.
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  entirely  possible  for  a  sentence  within  the
Guidelines  to  be  noncompliant,  because  the  judge  herself,  whose
compliance  is being  measured, calculated the  applicable  Guidelines range.
If you are doing the job honestly, you are trying to interpret the Guidelines,
as Nancy puts  it,  in a way that  is consistent  with  their purposes.  But not
everyone does that.  It is not only judges; prosecutors  and  defense  lawyers
can get together and create a Guidelines outcome.  A sentence that is within
a  Guidelines  range  that results  from  manipulated  Guidelines  calculations
will register statistically as a "compliant"  sentence,  when in fact it is not.
Often,  in  perfect  good  faith,  I  can  impose  a  sentence  in  two  different
ways.  I can say, "You  know, I read this guideline this way and I am going
to take two points off because I do not think this guideline applies."  If, as a
result  of that,  I  give  a  particular  sentence  within  that  newly  configured
Guidelines  range,  it  counts  as  compliant.  But  if instead  I  decide,  "You
know, it is a close call, but I think really the Guideline should be interpreted
the other way and he gets the two points; but when  I look at all the factors, I
think  the  sentence  should  be  a  little  lower,"  the  same  answer,  the  same
bottom line, will be considered noncompliant.
14.  Frank  0.  Bowman,  III,  The  Year of Jubilee... Or Maybe Not:  Some Preliminary
Observations About the Operation of the Federal  Sentencing System After Booker, 43 Hous.
L. Rev. 279 (2006).
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Watch  your wallet  when people talk about  disparity.  Watch your wallet
when  people talk about compliance.  Look behind that talk and try to figure
out what they are really talking about.
The  fourth word  I want to talk about  is "presumption."  Here  is where  I
think I differ from  Judge  Kopf, because  I do not think  it  is  a good  idea to
talk about hard presumptions.  I do think, though, that if we are playing the
game  fairly,  if we  are  trying  to  do  what  Congress  mandates,  then  most
sentences will and should be within the Guidelines.  Congress,  after all, gets
to  make the law, that  is their power; the Executive  has to  follow that when
it may not like it, and the Judiciary has  to follow that when  it may not like
it.
That does not mean, however, that there should be a presumption in favor
of the  Guidelines  sentence.  That  is  not  what  the  Supreme  Court  said  in
Booker, and it is  not what the statute  says, at least  once you excise  the part
that  the  Supreme  Court  excised.  The  statute  says  to  look  at  all of these
factors and impose the lowest sentence necessary to accomplish these goals,
only one of which is consideration of the Guidelines recommendations.
Nevertheless,  I  want  to  talk  about  a  psychological  and  a  legal
phenomenon that  I think will  and  should lead most judges  to  stay  close to
the Guidelines.
The  psychological  fact  is  that  there  is  in  social  science  literature  a
concept  called  "anchoring."  Some  folks  have  done  an  experiment  where
they  take  three  control  groups,  perfectly  matched  people  in  all  relevant
respects, and give them each a bottle of the same wine.
They  say  to  the  first group,  "We  are  going to  market  this wine  and we
would  like your  opinion as consumers.  We  would like to  know what you
think of this wine.  The  way we want you to express  your opinion is to tell
us how much you  would pay  for this bottle if you went  into a liquor store
and bought this wine."  The  subjects all give different answers  because  no
one  knows.  Everybody  pretends they have taste,  but nobody really  knows.
So the  experimenters  get  a whole  lot  of different  answers.  They  take  an
average, and the average comes out to $10.
Meanwhile, they take a second group and give that group the same bottle
of wine and set the same problem, except they say, "We are going to market
this wine.  We are thinking of marketing this for  $50  a bottle.  You tell us
what  you  would  pay."  Everybody  expresses  their  opinion.  When  the
experimenters  average the amounts, it comes out to $20;  it no longer comes
out to $10.
Then they  take the third  group  and  say,  "We  are thinking  of marketing
mass  quantities  of this  wine.  We  are  going to  sell this  for five  dollars  a
bottle, but we would like to know what you would pay."  And, sure enough,
what  was  a  $10  bottle  of  wine  now  comes  down  to  $6  or  $7.50  or
something.
That is  what anchoring  means:  When  you have  a  question  that  is  very
subjective  that  people  are  called  upon  to  answer  and  you  give  them  a
number as  a kind of baseline,  that number is very helpful.  Whether people
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like that number or not, even if they are angry about that  number, does not
matter;  they  will  still  be  influenced  by  that  number.  That  is  the
psychological  fact.  I  think  it  is  psychologically  inevitable  that  the
Guidelines  will  have  a powerful  influence  on  sentences,  even  if they  are
purely advisory, because  they put a number on a question that is otherwise
quite subjective.
There is also a legal fact.  If you look at the factors in § 3553(a),  first, the
Guidelines  recommendation  itself  is  a  factor  in  its  own  right.  Second,
avoiding disparity  is a  factor.  As  I  said, avoiding  disparity  can  be  a very
complicated  thing,  and,  in my  opinion,  often  you  avoid  disparity  by  not
following  the Guidelines.  But more  often, if we all  follow the Guidelines,
there  will be less  disparity.  That is  a factor that will often  cut in  favor of
following  the Guidelines.  Third,  the need for just punishment  is a factor,
and the need to deter crimes is a factor.  Of course, we all have our opinions
about  what  kind  of  sentence  is  necessary  in  order  to  impose  just
punishment.
Let me tell  you something  about the way  sentencing works.  We judges
sit  in  a room  and  we  see  the facts.  That  is  something  that drives  us  in
sentencing.  We see the particular cases.  We see the sorrowful mothers, not
only of the defendants  but also of the victims.  We see the people  who  lost
their life savings.  We see the people with horrible lives that led them into a
life  of crime  and  brought them  before the  bar of justice.  We  see  all the
messed-up  stuff that happens  in particular cases.  We  see the  intensity with
which one case  differs  from another case, and that is something that drives
us, and  I think it should  drive us.  I think  it is wrong  for the  law to ignore
those factors.
On  the  other hand, even  if we  have  a  unique  perspective  that Congress
lacks,  it is a limited perspective.  I agree  with Judge Kopf about this.  It is
not just that we do not have a mechanism for taking the broad view; I think
we are psychologically  incapacitated  from taking  the broad  view.  We  are
looking at grief when we impose sentences.  We have a hard time-I have a
hard time-looking  at these  people  and  inflicting  pain  on them,  which  is
what I am asked to do.  By the same token, we have  all the facts about the
victims as well and that will push us in the opposite direction.  But what we
do not have is the overview, the policy perspective,  and that is an important
perspective to have.
A little digression:  Let me bring it back to § 3553(a).  I think that I am in
a very  good position to assess  some facts, that  I am  in a better position to
assess  those  facts  than  the  Sentencing  Commission  or  even  the
democratically  elected  members  of  Congress.  When  we  are  asked  to
consider in  § 3553(a) the particular characteristics  of an individual-when
we  are  asked  to  consider  whether  this  person  is  a  threat  to  society  or
whether  this  person  is  in  need  of rehabilitation  and,  if so,  how  much-I
think we have a better  view than Congress, because  we  see that person and
Congress does not.
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On  the other hand,  it helps  to  have  a broader view  when the  questions
are, "what  does  society need as  a whole?  and are  these  sentences for drug
cases, which seem outrageously  severe to me, really necessary?"  it helps to
have a broader view.  Of course,  I have  my own  opinions  on that, and like
everybody else, I think my view is right and yours is wrong; I think mine is
right  and  Congress's  is  wrong.  But  I  am  just one  citizen.  If Congress
thinks  that I am wrong,  if a majority  of the people think that  I  am wrong,
then I think they are in a better position than I am to set that social policy.
As a citizen,  I may  not like the  general assumption that  we are  going to
be  tough on drugs.  Well, I  get  to vote.  If other  people  vote for the guys
who think this is good public policy,  well guess what?  It  is a democracy.
They win.
What  conduct  is  necessary  to  deter?  I  agree  with  Judge  Gertner,  the
Commission  does a terrible job of what they could, in an ideal world, do a
wonderful job of doing  real  studies about  what works  with deterrence  and
who  needs to be incapacitated.  Whether the  Commission does  a good job
or  a bad job, it is entrusted  with that job.  The  result is that the factors of
punishment  and  deterrence  will  favor imposition of a Guidelines  sentence
in most cases.
I think several of the factors mandated by the statute will and should lean
us  towards  the  Guidelines.  I  do  not  think  I  would  like  to  see  appellate
courts turn that into a hard presumption, but I think the cumulative  effect of
those  factors  is that we  are likely to  stick  with the  Guidelines.  Moreover,
because  of the  anchoring  phenomenon,  I think  we  are  also  likely  not  to
deviate  that much when we  do deviate.  When you look at these  studies  of
judicial "compliance"  with the Guidelines  after Booker, one question to ask
(which is rarely asked) is, what is the extent of the departure?
I suspect that after Booker, life is better for judges in most respects.  But
it  is not better  in one way:  It is much  more  painful  to impose sentences.
You can not hide behind the Guidelines  anymore.  You can not  say to the
grieving  mother,  "Sorry,  mercy  is  not  in  my  vocabulary.  Congress  has
forbidden  me to consider it."  You have to say, "In this case your kid has to
go to jail for the good of society.  I am not going to exercise mercy, that is
my call, and I am making it."  That is a painful thing for judges.
On  the  other  hand,  nobody  likes  to  be  a  potted  plant,  in  Brendan
Sullivan's famous term.15  Nobody likes to be someone who is sitting there
as  a figurehead.  People want  to  feel that they  are  doing justice.  That  is
why we are doing this instead of getting paid the big bucks somewhere else.
So it is better for us to have that discretion.
But is it better for defendants?  I  am not sure  it  will be, at least by very
much,  because  I  suspect  that for  all  of the  reasons  I have  suggested,  the
extent  of departures  is  not  going  to  be  that  great.  If the  general  public
policy is "get tough on crime," judges will be enlisted to execute that policy
15.  See Behind  the Accusatory  Outbursts, Sullivan Has a Protective Purpose, Wash.
Post, July  10,  1987, at A14.
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and  they will follow that policy.  They may trim  it around the  edges; they
may  save  some  poor  devils  who  are  particularly  sympathetic  from  the
fullest  rigors  of that  system.  But Booker  does  not  represent  the  day  of
jubilee for defendants and defense  lawyers,  and, for a variety of reasons,  I
do not think it is or should be for judges either.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR  CAPRA:  I  would  like  to  open  it  up  now,  if any  of the
panelists want to comment on what has gone before.
Judge Adelman, since you went first, do you have any reactions you want
to speak of?  Otherwise, I will direct specific questions.
JUDGE ADELMAN:  I think it is interesting that even though there are
different emphases  among the judges, what I think I heard correctly  is that
everybody  likes Booker a  lot better than the mandatory  Guidelines  system.
I think that is significant  because probably  over the next year or so, maybe
sooner,  we  will  face  possible  threats  to  Booker.  So  I  think  that  is  a
significant fact.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Judge Gertner.
JUDGE GERTNER:  I want to respond to Judge Kopf for a moment.
Congress does not sentence  an individual;  Congress  sets the broad social
policy.  As  Judge  Lynch  said,  the  broad  social  policy,  particularly  with
respect  to  drugs,  is  drawing  everyone's  sentences  up  from  where  they
would otherwise be.  The sentence  by Judge Wolf I described  earlier went
from ten years to  eight.  If given full discretion,  he would have chosen two
or one.  But clearly, Congress's social policy is being implemented.
The Guidelines drafters recognized that  it is difficult to prescribe a  single
set  of  guidelines  that  encompasses  the  vast  range  of  human  conduct
particularly  relevant to a sentencing decision.  The  Commission recognizes
that  circumstances  that  may  warrant  departure  from  the  Guidelines  range
cannot be comprehensively listed and analyzed  in advance.
There  is  a  difference  between  broad  social  policy  and  individuals.
Having  said  that,  I  agree  with  Judge  Kopf  that  we  need  to  develop
principled means of distinguishing between one defendant and all the others
under the Guidelines.  We do that  in every other aspect  of our work.  We
come  up  with principled distinctions.  We create  common law rules.  The
court of appeals either thinks they are good or does not think they are good.
We have begun to exchange sentencing  information in my court so that I
can  hear  the basis  for  Judge  Wolf's  sentence  and  I  can  decide whether  it
applies in my case.  From that will come additional rules and standards, just
as they evolve in everything else we do.
And  finally,  if the Guidelines  are what  Congress  wants and that  is why
we should interpret them, then we have a serious  separation of powers issue
here.  The  Sentencing  Commission  is  in  the  Judicial  Branch.  The
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Sentencing Commission was intended not to be, as Justice Scalia described
it, a "junior-varsity Congress." 16
JUDGE KOPF:  In dissent.
JUDGE GERTNER:  Yes, in dissent.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Eight to one.
JUDGE GERTNER:  Yes.  But he is now going to be in the majority,  so
it  should  not  be  a  one-to-one  correlation  between  the  Commission  and
Congress.
JUDGE  KOPF:  It is  interesting  for  Judge  Gertner  to  speak for  Justice
Scalia.
JUDGE GERTNER:  Yes, it is.
JUDGE  KOPF:  It makes me tingle.
[Laughter]
JUDGE GERTNER:  We are onboard on this one.
But,  seriously,  the  Mistretta17  Court  based  its  decision  regarding  the
sentencing  system  on the  fact  that the  Sentencing  Commission was  in  the
Judicial  Branch.  The  setup  of  the  statute  implied  that  the  Sentencing
Commission would do that which Congress could not do, which was look at
the minutiae of sentencing and come up with standards and guidelines.  It is
not  a  one-to-one  correlation  between  what  Congress  wants  and  the
Guidelines.  And Congress cannot sentence individuals.  That is why we set
up the framework that we did.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Judge Kopf, do you want to respond?
JUDGE KOPF:  The goat passes.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Okay.
Well, let us  take an example of what Congress wants.  Congress  wants a
one hundred-to-one  sentencing ratio for crack-to-powder  cocaine.  What do
we  do  with  a  one  hundred-to-one  sentencing  ratio  after  Booker?  Judge
Kopf, how about we start with you?
JUDGE  KOPF:  If it  were  up  to  me,  I  would  use  a  different  ratio.
Twenty-to-one  is the  last iteration of what  the  Commission suggested  was
appropriate.  But it is absolutely clear that Congress rejected that.
I  agree  that  there  may  be  circumstances  in  a  crack  case  that  may  be
idiosyncratic,  but,  generally  speaking,  to  reject  the  ratio  categorically  is
simply to tell Congress to go to hell.  If you want to do that, fine, but be up-
front and  say what you are doing.
JUDGE GERTNER:  I agree with you.
JUDGE KOPF:  Well, let me conclude, and then maybe you will not.
JUDGE GERTNER:  I am just so excited.
JUDGE KOPF:  As am I.
[Laughter]
16.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,  427 (1989)  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17.  488 U.S. 361.
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But that  is not what happens.  No  one  sits down  and  says,  "Screw  you,
Congress,  I  am not  enforcing  this."  There  is  always  reference  to  some
higher  abstract principles,  when the  abstract principles  have,  for whatever
good or bad reason, been rejected.
I think  the question  has  been answered  by  Congress.  I  think  they  are
wrong, but they are not irrational;  that is to say, they are not crazy.
PROFESSOR  CAPRA:  We  are  going  to  let  Judge  Adelman  speak
because he has written on the matter.
JUDGE ADELMAN:  I think I was actually  the first judge in the country
to  impose  a non-Guidelines  sentence  based  on the disparity between  crack
and  powder  and the  way  crack  is treated.  I do not  think any  reasonable
person  would disagree  that there  is  no reasonable  basis  for the distinction
between  the  way  the  Guidelines  treat  crack  and  powder.  I  do  not  think
anybody  would  disagree  that  it  has  huge  implications  for racial  disparity.
So here is a case where-
JUDGE KOPF:  Judge Adelman, are you saying that the crack guidelines
are irrational in the legal sense of that word?
JUDGE  ADELMAN:  Well,  "legal"  is  a  slippery  word.  Judge  Lynch
was talking about slippery words.
JUDGE  KOPF:  But  are  you saying  it is unconstitutional because,  even
apart from the race angle,  it is irrational?
JUDGE  ADELMAN:  No.  I  think  courts  have  ruled  to  the  contrary.
Courts  have  said  that  the  different  legal  treatment  between  crack  and
powder does not violate  the Equal Protection Clause.  I am using the word
"rationality"  in its ordinary sense, rather than its legal sense.
The  Sentencing  Commission  has  said  that  the  one  hundred-to-one
distinction between powder and crack makes no sense.  It went to Congress,
and  Congress  said-I  think  it  failed  by  six votes-"we  are  not going  to
change  it."
I do  not think that binds me.  There  are two different kinds of situations.
One  is  a mandatory  minimum; there Congress has  passed  a law,  and  I am
bound by that.  No doubt about  it, I have got to follow  it, whatever  I think
of it.
But Congress  has not  passed  any  law;  they rejected  a recommendation
from the  Commission.  I  do not have to follow  a  sort  of vague  legislative
intent.  I do not think the fact  that Congress turned down the Commission
binds  me.  The  Guidelines  are  advisory,  so I  do not have  to  follow  them.
There  is no  statute  that  says that  I am stuck  with this  one  hundred-to-one
distinction,  except  if there  is a mandatory minimum.  Therefore,  I  think I
am not bound by it.
There  are  a couple  of cases.  Recently,  the First  Circuit  has  said to the
contrary,18 and also the Fourth Circuit.19  But I think those decisions, if you
read them, are really badly analyzed.
18.  United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53  (1st Cir. 2006).
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JUDGE GERTNER:  I do not agree with that.
JUDGE ADELMAN:  All right.
But since when  do I have  to follow  something  that is not  a law?  I only
have  to  follow  Congress's laws, that  is  all.  If Congress has not  enacted  a
law, my responsibility is to follow the  §  3553(a)  factors.
Nobody  in their right mind thinks that  the Guidelines  are  reasonable  on
this point.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Judge Lynch.
JUDGE LYNCH:  For me, this is the hardest question.  I think we should
not be distracted by it in the sense of thinking that this  is a typical question
about the post-Booker world.  This is an atypical question.
To me it is hard for several reasons.  I  do not think that it is a good idea
for  some judges  to  say,  "We  are just  not  going  to  follow  this  particular
guideline,"  because  the  problem  is  that  other judges  will  take  a different
view.  Then  we  will  have  identical  defendants  being  sentenced  very
differently based on different judges'  beliefs about drug sentences.  I do not
think that is what  is going on in the post-Booker world, and  I do not think
that should be going on.
There  is a problem,  though.  I  do  not know that  I would  use the word
"irrational,"  but  I  would  use  the  word  "evil."  Under  the  mandatory
Guidelines,  I have imposed many sentences that, if I were given the godlike
power that judges used to have,  I would not have imposed.  They were not
sentences  that  in  my  heart  of hearts  I think represent  the  best  version  of
justice.  But  they  were  not  nuts-they  were  not  "irrational,"  in  Judge
Kopf s words-and they were not ultimately evil.  I may think they do not
lead to  good public  policy,  I may think they hurt more  than they help, but
reasonable people can differ about that.
The crack ratio is something that I think goes beyond this, because it is so
far beyond what is reasonable.  I think reasonable people  can conclude that
there  are  a  variety  of social  reasons  why  crack  should  be  treated  more
seriously  than powder, but  at the  one hundred-to-one  ratio, you  are talking
about sentences that inflict enormous harm beyond any justification.
Some young  man who was in the Justice  Department was  quoted  in the
early days of the Bush Administration  in the New  York Times as essentially
saying, yes, people  talk about this 100:1  ratio.  That is a liberal red herring.
It is wrong, because the sentences  are not  100:1.  That ratio treats  one gram
of crack as a hundred grams of powder, but that does not mean the sentence
is a hundred  times  as great.  It  is only  five times as great.  What are  they
complaining about?20  If you know what powder sentences are like and then
you multiply them by five, well, that fellow should get that kind of sentence
for callously trivializing these enormous sentencing disparities.
19.  United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006).
20.  See Neil  A. Lewis, Justice Department Opposes Lower Jail Terms for Crack, N.Y.
Times (Late Edition), Mar. 20, 2002, at A5.
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It does have a profound racial impact.  The drug trade is like many illegal
activities.  The gangs that get involved  in these things  are often ethnically
organized because people trust people who are like them.  And sure enough,
it  turns  out  that  different  kinds  of  people,  different  ethnic  groups,  find
themselves  in control of particular distribution  networks.  The consequence
is  that  African-Americans  are  sentenced  disproportionately  more  heavily
because  of crack.  These  are people  who, in terms  of their  role in the drug
trade,  are  identical,  selling  what  is  actually  the  same  chemical,  getting
vastly different treatment under the statutes and Guidelines.
We are not here to talk about equal protection analysis, but to me  this is
just reckless indifference to that kind of disparity,  and Congress  is afraid to
look like  it is  softening on  anything.  The  result is  that we have  sentences
that go beyond unjust in this area, and I find it very offensive.
Sorry for the editorial.  Let me  get back to what  I have  to  do.  I do not
believe  judges  post-Booker are  supposed  to  just  categorically  reject  the
Sentencing Commission's policy about any particular crime.  But that is the
problem.  I think this is the one place  where a lot of judges really do feel a
pull to just say,  "We  are not going to do  it."  I am sure  you could not find
five  like that.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  We have one right here.
JUDGE  LYNCH:  No,  no,  I am  not talking  about judges.  I mean you
could not  find five areas,  five guidelines,  five rules, five  sentencing issues
where judges will  be strongly  tempted to just ignore  or reject  a Guidelines
position  across  the board.  Maybe  you  could  not find three,  and  I am not
sure I can quickly come up with another one.
PROFESSOR  CAPRA:  I  have  got  another  coming  up,  but  Judge
Presnell wants to speak.
JUDGE  PRESNELL:  Well, I think it is  important for those who are not
in the process-particularly  the law students-to understand how this really
works.
If you read my  Williams21  opinion, we  have a young, twenty-something-
year-old  black  kid  who  is  a  petty  powder  cocaine  dealer.  He  has  been
through  the  state  system  three  or four  times  and  he  has  served  a  total  of
three  years  in prison.  The  state  says,  "Look,  our state  laws  are not  tough
enough.  We are going to turn him over to the feds."  So the feds go out and
they get an undercover  agent and they decide, "Look,  we  can only get him
for maybe  seven or eight years  on powder,  so we  are just going to set him
up  with  crack."  They  send  the  undercover  agent  in,  and  he  buys  some
crack, he goes back, and they keep buying until they have the amount they
need  to  get  the  sentence  they  want.  That  is  the  way  it  works  from  the
prosecutorial standpoint.
I included a footnote in my opinion that just recognizes the disparity and
the political concern about the racial  implications.  I did not  say it was the
21.  United States v. Williams,  372 F. Supp. 2d  1335 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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basis  for  my  opinion,  but  the  U.S.  Attorney  has  used  that  as  one  of the
arguments on appeal.  The case is before the Eleventh Circuit now.
But powder  cocaine and crack  cocaine are the  same chemical  substance.
I do  not see  how you get that disparity,  either.  We keep using  this word
"departure,"  and  we should not, because  we are not departing now;  we  are
sentencing pursuant to the 3553(a) factors.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Okay.  The second  one I have  is illegal reentry
cases.  Illegal  reentry  cases  under  the  PROTECT  Act  authorize  the
Department  of  Justice  to  set  up  what  are  called  fast-track  departures. 22
Certain  districts  have  fast-track  departures,  which  result  in  a  four-level
reduction if there is quick cooperation.  But other districts  do not have fast-
track  departure.  I  think we  do not  have  a  fast-track  departure  district  in
New York.  Do you have one?
JUDGE KOPF:  We are.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Nebraska is one.
JUDGE  GERTNER:  We  are  not technically  one,  but we  are  de  facto
one.
PROFESSOR  CAPRA:  So the  question  is,  under Booker, how does  a
district become a de facto fast-track departure system?
JUDGE  GERTNER:  Well,  I will  tell  you.  This  is  another  issue  with
"compliance."  There  is someone  who  is picked up for illegal reentry  after
deportation.  All  of  a  sudden,  you  get  a  request  from  both  sides,  the
government  and  the  defense,  to  have  a  sentencing  without  a presentence
report.  The  person  is  then  sentenced  without  a presentence  report.  The
defense asks for time served.  The government  stands mute.  Time served is
way below what the Guidelines would otherwise identify.
I am having a battle over  the Massachusetts  statistics.  When  I looked at
our Booker departures,  at what was in that category,  there were  eighteen or
twenty  cases  where  clearly the  government  and  the  defense  were  getting
together to get these people out of the country and deported.  So there are de
facto fast tracks around the country.
A good deal of the criticism about the post-Booker world is that there are
regional  disparities.  It is not clear to me that the regional disparities are any
different  than they were before.  It  also makes  an enormous  difference  on
your  docket.  If you have  lots  of small  cases  and  are  overwhelmed  with
immigration  cases,  there  are certain pressures  on your  docket.  It does  not
make  sense that  in a post-Booker world we would recognize  those regional
differences,  those  regional  pressures,  with  respect to  some  issues  but  not
with respect to others.
In Massachusetts  we are overwhelmed  with street crime, but virtually  no
white-collar  crime.  As  a  result,  the  prosecution  has  a  lower  rate  of
cooperation  departures  than  anywhere  else  in the  country.  Small wonder.
22.  Prosecutorial  Remedies and  Tools  Against  the Exploitation of Children  Today  Act
of 2003  (PROTECT Act),  Pub. L. No.  108-21,  § 401(m)(2)(b),  117 Stat. 650, 674 (2003).
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These cases are so small there is no one to cooperate  against.  If the Booker
variance  rate  is high, it  is because these small cases, individuals  on a street
comer with crack, test the Guidelines  more than anything else.
So the question of regional disparity, if people are serious about it, would
essentially  wipe  out the  fast-track program.  But I think maybe  we should
be attentive to regional pressures.  Gun charges look different in New York
than they do elsewhere  in the country.
Within  a  broader  framework  of  a  national  system,  I  am  suggesting
variations  around  the  kind  of anchoring  phenomenon  that  Judge  Lynch
talked  about.  Variations  on  a  theme  will  not  bring  us back  to the  pre-
Guidelines world.  They will be variations  on a theme,  as  opposed to wild
swings  from one end of the country to the other.
PROFESSOR  CAPRA:  Did  you want  to  speak  about  the  fast  track,
Judge Adelman?
JUDGE  ADELMAN:  Well,  let me just make  a related point.  The  fast
track has to do with imposing a lower sentence on somebody who enters the
country  after  being  deported  and  committing  a  felony.  The  idea  of fast
track  is  some  districts  allow  lower  sentences,  so judges  in  other districts
have been lowering their sentences out of the disparity theory.
I actually think there is a more important issue  in the illegal reentry cases
and that this other issue  illustrates something  that nobody talks about  very
much now.
There  is  a  sixteen-level  enhancement  to  the  Guidelines  for  certain
aggravated felonies,  so the sentence goes way, way up.  If you do any kind
of research into how that sixteen-level enhancement  got passed, basically it
was the Sentencing Commission.
Somebody  made  a motion-you know,  I used  to be  in the legislature;  I
know how  these things happen.  There  was  not any  long  study,  there was
not  any  sort  of "here  is  the  reason,  here  are  the problems,  here  are  the
statistics."  It was just "here  is a motion.  How about sixteen levels?"
That is about how the  one  hundred-to-one  crack ratio happened,  too.  It
came about after the Len Bias case-the basketball  player.23  So this is how
things sometimes  get enacted,  both in the legislature  and in the  Sentencing
Commission.
I did some opinions regarding the fast track.  But in those opinions  I also
talked about-and nobody has really picked up on this, which is way more
interesting to me than the disparity issue-the lack of basis for this sixteen-
level enhancement.
I think that is important because  if you study the Guidelines,  you see that
we do not really know  much about how the Sentencing  Commission  chose
the numbers.  It was all private.  It was not reviewed, as Judge  Gertner said
23.  See  generally  WashingtonPost.com,  The  Len  Bias  Tragedy,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/longterm/memories/bias/launchbiasfnt.htm
(last visited Aug.  14, 2006).
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earlier, by any judge; it was not reviewed by Congress.  It was not reviewed
by anybody.
I think that  it is  important  now,  in this  new post-Booker world,  to  talk
about  whether the particular numbers  in particular Guidelines  are  rational,
and  to  criticize  and  scrutinize  them, because  the  problem  is  that  we  are
dealing  with the  Guidelines  like  they are  the  Ten Commandments.  Even
when  they  are  advisory,  they  still  have  this  sort  of  aura-everybody
measures everything against the Guidelines.
The  Guidelines  themselves  have  not  really  been  scrutinized,  and  now
under this new regime they can be.  So I would make a pitch for that.
JUDGE LYNCH:  Could  I just make  a point?  There  are a lot of people
who  I  see  in the  audience  who know what all  these words  mean, but there
are also a lot of law students.  It is probably useful to just clarify a couple  of
things.
First, you  should  know  what  sixteen  levels  means.  If you  go up  two
levels, that is typically  a twenty-five  percent increase  in  sentence; another
two levels, another twenty-five percent above that, and so on.
JUDGE PRESNELL:  Plus the base for this crime  is eight.
JUDGE LYNCH:  Yes, so sixteen levels is a huge jump.
Second, what  is the jump for?  It is a  crime to reenter the country  after
you have been  deported;  that  is the basic  crime.  But  it is  a more  serious
crime,  and there  is  a separate  statutory  maximum  that also gives  you this
Guidelines  enhancement,  if  you  reenter  the  country  after  having  been
deported  for  what  is  called  an  "aggravated  felony."  That  sounds  pretty
reasonable  until you realize  that an  aggravated  felony  does not have to  be
aggravated,  and it does not have to be a felony.  It just has to be on this big
long  list, and Congress  and the Commission have periodically  added to the
list.  The  list  is  somewhere  else  in  the  immigration  laws,  and  Congress
keeps  throwing  things  in  it,  and  it  is  incorporated  by  reference  into  the
Guidelines.
The  thing to understand  about  fast  track, when people  talk about  what
happens  in different districts, is that it  is a Justice Department program;  it is
a  government-sponsored  program.  The  government  asks  for  these
departures,  the prosecutor asks  for these  departures,  in particular  districts.
Most of those districts are along the southern rim of the country, but not all
of them.
I was surprised  when  I found out that Nebraska was one.  I did not find
out today.  I  found out because  one  of my students  at Columbia  did some
research into the fast-track program.  I learned a lot of things I did not know
before.  For example,  I thought there was one fast-track program, and if the
local  U.S. Attorney petitioned the Justice Department,  you could have  it in
your district if they thought  it was  appropriate.  But that  is not so.  In fact,
there  are  lots of different fast-track  programs  in  lots of different  districts,
and they are all different.  In some places  you get four levels,  in some you
get one, in some you get two, and it has a lot to do with what  it takes to get
enough guilty pleas to clear the dockets and stop using so many government
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resources.  So  it  is  quite  a  remarkable  little  piece  of disparity  in  its own
right.
I do want to raise, though,  one bigger issue about regional  disparity.  I am
for regional  disparity.  I think one of the foolishnesses of the Guidelines  is
the notion that because  we are one  federal  system, we  are one  sovereignty,
the  United  States  of  America,  everybody  in  the  country  should  be
sentencing in the same way.
I  said before, and I mean it, that  I think it  is  a terrible  idea that  I should
give  radically  different  sentences  than the judge  in the  next courtroom.  I
am not  sure  it  is  so  odd or wrong  that  I  should  give somewhat  different
sentences than a federal judge  in Texas.  They have a different culture  and
they have  different  social  problems  than we  do.  There  is also the  simple
fact that they sit in  different  states than  we do.  Another piece of disparity
that we do not often talk about is the disparity between the federal  sentence
and  the  state  sentence  for the same  kind of criminal  behavior.  As  Judge
Presnell  said,  people  get  put  in  the  federal  system  because  somebody
decided to put them there.  Some prosecutor decided that this guy should be
prosecuted  federally,  not necessarily  because  they  were  out to get  him  or
because  they thought he was a bad guy.  Maybe they were investigating his
neighborhood  or they  were  investigating  his organization,  and  some  poor
schlub  who  is  selling  drugs  for  that  organization  is  suddenly  a  federal
offender and is going to get the federal sentence,  while somebody who  is in
the state system gets a different sentence.
Here is an example from right here in the Southern District of New York:
You  may  have  heard  or  read  that  the  Manhattan  District  Attorney  has
considered himself from time to time  a rival  of the United  States Attorney.
There is not a lot of cooperation  there.  In the Bronx, however, there is a lot
of cooperation.  That means that if you are a felon in possession of a firearm
and  you happen to be  on the east  side  of the  Harlem River,  you  are  very
likely to be turned over to the feds and you will get a very severe  sentence.
If you  are  on the  west  side  of the  Harlem  River  in  Manhattan  doing the
same  thing,  you  will  be  prosecuted  in  the  state  system  and  get  a  very
different  sentence.  That  is a piece  of disparity  that neither the judges  nor
the  Sentencing  Commission  have  any  control  over.  But  when  we  are
sentencing a drug or gun offender, should it not be relevant what happens to
similar offenders  in  the state where  we  are  sitting?  If he were  in the  state
court across the street, is  he going to get the same  severe  sentence  as he  is
in federal court or is he going to be treated much more leniently?
There  really  are  significant  differences  in  the  way  different  kinds  of
crimes  are  treated  around  the  country.  I  do  not  know  why  that  is
necessarily so terrible.  Along a border, they have a lot of these immigration
cases, and they probably  are different  from the ones that we get.  They may
have people  who just got back over the border or people who are part of a
community that  is always moving back and forth across the border.  It  is a
different  story than the  same crime by people  in New York or in Chicago,
who  are  usually  caught  because  they  have  been  arrested  for  some  other
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crime.  I am not arguing that we ought to be so severe on illegal immigrants
necessarily.  I am just saying there  is  a different  story here than there is in
Brownsville,  Texas.
PROFESSOR  CAPRA:  That issue of state-federal  disparity  is discussed
in one of Judge Adelman's opinions.24
Judge Gertner.
JUDGE  GERTNER:  I have  a  stark  example  of that.  I just  finished  a
case  that could have been a potential death  penalty case.  Two  gangs were
shooting  at  each  other.  One  was  prosecuted  as  a  RICO  case  in  federal
court,  subject  to  the  death  penalty,  but  the  gang  at  which  they  were
shooting, who were shooting back, was being prosecuted  in the state court,
for which there was no death penalty.
It  was  even  worse  than  that.  All  federal  jurisdictions  wind  up  taking
juries  from  largely  suburban  areas-not  in  New  York  so  much,  but
certainly  the Eastern District of Massachusetts has seven percent people of
color.  If the same crime was tried across the street, there would have been
twenty to thirty percent people of color on the jury.  So there was a prospect
of trying a death penalty  case to  a largely  white or all-white jury based  on
the  decision  of  the  prosecutor.  I  think  that  this  is  part  of  what  the
discussion  should be, because  when you  talk about disparity  you really  do
have  to talk  about all  the players  in  disparity,  rather  than  controlling just
one player.
As one of my colleagues once  said, discretion  is hydraulic;  if you control
one person, it flows to someone else.  One of the issues that occurred under
the  mandatory  Guidelines was  that judges  lost their discretion,  and  it was
then mightily transferred to the prosecutor, under very different terms.
There  is  also  a  disparity  that  comes  from  different  state  systems.
Massachusetts  is  not  a  Guidelines  state,  so  I  am  often  asked  to  interpret
sentences  that were  administered  in a non-Guidelines  state and  plug them
into  the  Guidelines.  So,  for  example,  there  is  sort  of  a  community
alternative  here,  called  "continued  without  a  finding."  It  is  done  all
throughout the Massachusetts  courts.  It is a way of getting someone under
the supervision of the court without a guilty plea.  The Guidelines treat that
as a conviction, and treat  it very  seriously.  The  state judge that imposed it
surely did not.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:  Judge Kopf, do you have a comment?
JUDGE KOPF:  What you are hearing  is the degree to which judges view
their  ability  to  develop  a  coherent  methodology  of  sentencing.  Some
people, God bless them, think that they have that ability, and others do not.
My question to the panelists  would be this:  Now that you have raised all
these problems,  what  are  you going  to do-what  is your response to this?
In individual  cases, you are going to write opinions to explain why it is you
are doing something.  What  does that do for the rest of the  country?  And
24.  United States  v. Wachowiak, 412 F.  Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
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why  is it that we care?  Why is it that we  want Judge Lynch to tell us what
is evil?  Why  is  it up  to him to decide that the  crack  Guidelines  are  evil?
Why do we want an unelected judge to derive his own categories of evil?
I  think  that  question,  prompted  by  Booker, compels  us  to  have  this
wonderful  debate about role.  Wherever you come down on this, ultimately
the question that  it asks district judges to answer is, what is our role?  It is a
profound and difficult question.